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I. INTRODUCTION
The military value of a weapon system has long been of
interest to decision makers who are charged with the
responsibility of developing and fielding such systems.
Consequently, a major methodological problem of military
operations research (see, for example, [Ref. 25] or [Ref. 12])
is how to determine the worth (i.e., the effectiveness of
a system according to some scale) of existing systems and
how to forecast that of proposed systems. The subtle
difficulty of this problem and its importance in military
operations research is clearly indicated by its continuing
discussion at Military Operations Research Symposia (see
Ref. [22]), in open literature [Ref. 17] and in monographs
[Ref. 19].
This thesis is concerned with the development of
methodology for the evaluation of air defense systems. Prior
to developing this methodology it appears worthwhile to
critically review previous methods used in air defense
evaluations and to examine the factors upon which system
effectiveness depends.
Precise definitions can significantly assist the
organization and communication of ideas and information. To
facilitate the development of methodology for evaluating air
defense system effectiveness, there are several terms which
require definition. Ackoff [Ref. 1] defines methodology as

the study of scientific methods, which has as its objectives
the improvement of the procedures employed in the conduct
of research. The importance of methodology is primarily
the establishment of a standard to be applied as a means of
controlling research.
Reference 44 defines the noun evaluation as: "The
appraisal or determination of worth, value...." There are
two connotative elements of evaluation for purposes of this
thesis: first, appraise or determine implies an action
pursuant to a result and second, worth or value implies a
result.
Likewise, Reference 44 defines a system as: "a combination
or arrangement of parts, elements .. .into a whole according
to some rational principle." Extending the definition to the
term air defense system yields a working definition for this
thesis; an air defense system is the combination of tactical
units, equipment, logistics, command control and communication
3(C ) , and other .interrelated forces (ground or air) that are
determined by the specification of a precise organizational
level (i.e., battery, battalion, brigade, region).
In addition to the terms mentioned previously, system
effectiveness must be defined. Reference 35 provides the
definition of system effectiveness used herein: "...the
extent of success to which the system may be expected to
achieve a set of objectives." This definition depends upon
three key elements ("the extent of success", "the system",

and "set of objectives") which will be developed in detail
in Section III.
In this thesis the definitions above will be used in
the following manner: (1) methodology will be the methods
of control or standards for research; (2) an evaluation will
mean an appraisal of the military worth of an air defense
system; and the definitions of air defense system and system
effectiveness will be used as defined, with the qualification
that system effectiveness is assumed to be one of the primary
means for appraising system worth.
There are several reasons for further developing method-
ology for evaluating air defense effectiveness. One reason,
discussed in Section II, is that many previous efforts were
primarily concerned with equipment, yet it is known that
equipment alone cannot determine the outcome of a conflict.
Rather, the outcome depends greatly upon the manner in which
military equipment is deployed and operated to provide a
coordinated air defense effort. Likewise, a successful
outcome is relative to an opposing enemy force with its own
objectives and tactics. Success also depends greatly on the
combined effects of different forces using different equipment
under the stress of combat. This means that broader aspects
than merely hardware must be considered in order to evaluate
system effectiveness.
Current reductions in the personnel strength of the Armed
Forces lead to another reason for the development of system
effectiveness methodology: reductions in manpower while

maintaining a high level of combat readiness and capability
inherently suggests the need for more effective employment
of available assets. This is especially true for Army Air
Defense assets, where some of the older equipment has been
deactivated and the remaining equipment must be evaluated
for possible changes in mission and disposition.
Lastly, the increasing cost of developing and fielding
new weapons requires better information concerning their
possible military value. It is unlikely that future systems
will ever be purchased in peacetime without a detailed
evaluation of potential military value obtained from the
new hardware.
This thesis was motivated by the shortcomings identified
in other evaluations (Refs. 5,28,30,43,45) that were examined
by the author and by the current interest in evaluation
methodologies by the defense establishment. The approach to
developing a methodology for air defense system effectiveness
is based on the concept of system effectiveness that has been
used in other areas [Ref. 2 5] and the major factors on which
this depends [Ref. 17]
.
The determination of a military system's effectiveness is
a key task in the defense planning process. A system's
effectiveness is a criterion for comparing alternatives in,
for example, the system acquisition process. The quantifica-
tion of system effectiveness is a difficult task, and a
critical one: the wrong quantification of system effectiveness
10

is tantamount to an incorrect planning decision. This thesis
seeks to develop a comprehensive system effectiveness method-
ology with which the many and diverse factors upon which
system effectiveness depends may be identified and systemat-
ically integrated into a realistic appraisal of system worth.
Section II provides a critical review of some past and
current evaluation methods and identifies some of the
weaknesses and methodological issues that must be overcome.
Section III identifies the major factors upon which system
effectiveness depends and shows how these are related to
each other. This system effectiveness methodology is
analyzed in Section V ; followed by conclusions and
recommendations in Section VI .
*
The reader may wish to refer to this section initially




In Section I the terms evaluation and air defense system
were defined and it was noted that system effectiveness is a
difficult but important measurement when determining the
worth of an air defense system. By contrast some of the
past efforts to appraise system effectiveness have not been
very successful.
A. METHODOLOGICAL HISTORY
It is interesting to note that for many years air defense
evaluations were based solely upon the single shot kill
probability of a missile or gun against typical threat
vehicles [Ref . 30] . Reference 35 discusses the single shot
kill probability (P , ) as a function of the impact point
SSJC
distribution and a lethality function (£(|x|) -
P [target killed | round lands distance |x| from the target]).





(x '* y ' a) £ <U|) dx
— 00
where f (x;y,a) is the impact point distribution and
Jt(|x|) is the lethality function. This measurement was
considered a useful tool because it had a degree of predictive
capability that the decision maker could use as an adjunct or
a replacement for the qualitative judgements he previously
12

relied upon. But the use of single shot kill probability
neglected vital engagement functions such as acquiring/
tracking and identification. This oversimplified use produced
overly optimistic results. Additionally, there was the
problem of ascertaining what a typical threat was in relation
to the missile or gun. Even when the evaluation was conducted
as a system engagement and the accompanying threat was
described (usually in terms of a nominal aircraft) , the
information provided to the decision maker was no more than
a compounding of probabilities where the probability of a
successful engagement (P ) might be described by
P =P . * P ,xp., . ,. x P ,
se acquire track identify ssk
Next, air defense systems were evaluated by determining
the cumulative kill probability against a nominal enemy
vehicle with a flight path from the system engagement envelope












For example, consider Figure 1 above where fire units
1, 2, and 3 are each capable of firing twice on the penetrator
Assuming independence between rounds and varying hit
probabilities (p^) the cumulative probability of hitting the
target at least once with n rounds is
n
P (1) = 1 - n (1-p.) , for i=l,2,...,n [Ref. 35]
n i=l 1
When independence of the effects of successive rounds is not
valid this approach is inadequate. An alternative would be
+ v»
to use the Markov property [Ref. 35] where the i round
stdepends only upon the i-1 round; if p is the probability of
a hit on the first round, then the probability of no hits
with n rounds is
P
n
(0) = (1-p) [P(m|m)] n 1
where P(m|m) = P (miss with i round|miss with i-1 round),
and the probability of at least one hit with n rounds is
P
n
(l) = 1 - (1-p) [P(m|m)] n -1 , for n > 1
This quantity (i.e., cumulative kill probability) is a
good measure of system firepower capability but does not
adequately reflect the true mission of an air defense system
which is to protect friendly assets by neutralizing enemy
14

aircraft. This is effectively a classic example of using
the wrong criterion for assessing system effectiveness: the
true mission of air defense is not to shoot down hostile
aircraft but to defend friendly assets. Other methodological
weaknesses were that in such an evaluation it was assumed
that the threat flew a level constant speed path through the
defense and that the vehicle would continue towards a higher
priority target rather than engage the air defense fire unit.
Many other measures have been used to evaluate air defense
and each has provided additional information to the evaluation
effort and each has also provided difficulties when used in an
evaluation.
One such measure is the mathematical expectation of
targets killed or damaged. Reference 38 defines the expected
value (mathematical expectation) of a discrete random
variable X, with probability density function p(x) as the
summation
E(X) = I x. p(xi )
i
This is an indication of what results might occur on the
average if a conflict were repeated a large number of times.
The main weakness in this measure is that it fails to tell
how much variability there is about the average. Thus, we
fail to know whether a radically different outcome is likely
15

For example, if Markov-dependent fire is assumed, the




P (h|h) - p
r
1 + P(h|m) - P(h|h) .
n P(h|m) L P(K|K) P(h|m) J '
but the expected number of rounds (n) gives no indication
of the "scatter" around n that might occur when concrete
realizations are obtained.
Expectation is less than adequate from the enemy point of
view also, because the expected number of sites suppressed
would not be sufficient information to determine whether or
not a gap or corridor existed in the defense. For example,
consider the missile units (x) and the raid corridor (arrow)
depicted in Figure 2. If the expectation was three missile
units suppressed the enemy would not be able to determine
whether or not the corridor was clear because E (X) would not





Additional measures of effectiveness that were introduced
and used in air defense evaluation were discussed in a study
[Ref. 30] which considered:
- the number of air defense systems required to provide
minimum coverage over a given area and against a
specific threat vehicle.
- the number of air defense systems to limit damage inflicted
to some predetermined value or to the point where adding
more defense resources results in diminishing returns.
A general evaluation methodology for air defense systems
would enable an analyst to determine the applicability and
point out the possible weaknesses of those measures listed
above
.
Likewise, the two measures which deal with the "number
of systems" may not be the most appropriate means to evaluate
a system. Selection of an inappropriate system may lead to
suboptimization if the system is too narrowly defined, and
if defined broadly it may not be feasible to obtain a valid
analytic expression to evaluate the system [Ref. 16]. This
point is illustrated in a recent thesis dealing with air
defense missile storage, where several different warheads
were available. The storage problem was evaluated at the
firing battery level and the results indicated that the
battalion or brigade levels would have been the proper system
to select [Ref. 28]
.
B. RECENT METHODS
One of the methodologies which has gained a great deal
of popularity and use was proposed by the Weapon System
17

Effectiveness Industry Advisory Committee (WSEIAC)
.
Effectiveness is discussed in terms of three major factors —
availability, dependability and capability.
The general form of WSEIAC effectiveness is given by the
following equation [Ref . 30] ;
Effectiveness = A x d x c
where A, D, and C are the factors pertaining to availability,
dependability and capability. Availability depends on the
condition of the system at the outset of a mission;
dependability describes the system conditions during a
mission; and capability describes the lethality or ability
of the system to accomplish its mission, given the system
condition during the mission. To apply the method to a given
mission for a particular system the system states (i.e. fully
operational, degraded operation, out of action, etc.) must be
related to availability and dependability measures and then
the capability measure relates the system state to the alter-
native mission outcomes. This works well in the case of some
air defense systems where the availability and dependability
may be influenced by several components. However, for other
military systems this approach may be of limited use when one
of the key factors of the general expression dominates the
development of effectiveness or effectiveness is desired at
a level above an individual weapon situation. For example,
a rifle has an almost certain probability of being available
18

and dependable, which leaves the capability as the factor
dominating the effectiveness value. With more complex systems
the factors become more difficult to model but the concept can
still be used.
An example of how this might be applied to a simplified
air defense situation might take the following form,
Effectiveness = A x d x C
where
A = f (time between failures, time to repair)
D = f (detection, transfer, evaluation)
C = f (missile launch, missile flight, lethality)
and further refinement might lead to the equation,
Effectiveness = A x p x p
a k
where
A = operational availability
P, = probability of acquisition evaluation and transfer
of a target
P, = launch reliability x missile flight reliability x
missile lethality
A relatively simple example such as the one above becomes
increasingly complex when degraded modes of operation,
multiple mission requirements, in-mission repairs and other
considerations are included. The wide use of this method and
the popularity it currently enjoys is because it is conceptually
19

applicable to a large number of systems and situations but
computational extension of this method is difficult. The
difficulty is readily observed by considering the transition
between system states caused by failure rates and in-mission
repair rates. Consider a simplified radar with four opera-
tional and non-operational modes (x-,, x~ / x^, x.) and with
two circuits (1, 2). Assume circuit 1 as a circuit whose
failure makes the radar out of action and circuit 2 degrades
the radar when it fails but does not put the radar out of
action. The differential equations of state transition rates
for this single piece of equipment would be
*2









where f. = failure rate for i circuit, i=l,2
r- = repair rate for i circuit, i=l,2
A more complete discussion of this example is given in
Reference 45.
Consider a weapon that has been evaluated according to
the WSEIAC method. If it is desired to extend the evaluation
to a higher system level then a choice must be made to
aggregate the weapon measures to include several systems,
20

each with its own set of measures, or to reformulate the task
strictly in terms of the parent system. The first case
results in an extremely difficult and perhaps intractible
situation computationally whereas the latter case may
generalize the results at the system level or may not use
system results at all.
The need to process and store large amounts of information,
when evaluating complex air defense systems, has resulted in
the increased use of simulations. One such simulation is the
Tactical Air Defense Computer Operational Simulation [Ref. 5]
(TACOS II) which simulates conflict between a large number
of air defense systems and a corresponding large force of
penetrator vehicles. It includes an environment and terrain
interaction and conducts a conflict situation, keeping track
of all critical events. The expressed objective of TACOS II
is to gain insight through total defense effectiveness
evaluation in support of force deployment, doctrine and
allocation analyses (Figure 3) . Additional utility is gained
through the use of TACOS as an input into a larger evaluation,
Deterministic Mix Evaluation, Worldwide (DMEW) [Ref. 40].
TACOS II is a powerful tool which does provide a great
deal of information, but there are difficulties associated
with it that leave some unanswered questions with respect to
air defense effectiveness. One such difficulty is the lack
of an interaction with friendly interceptors. In an area of




































more than 2000 penetrator vehicles are postulated, one must
also postulate the interaction of every friendly interceptor
that can become airborne which TACOS does not consider.
Similarly there is no interaction with ground combat forces
which affect the deployment of divisional and Field Army
Air Defense assets, which in turn affect the targeting and
tactics of the penetrator vehicles. The point to be made
here is the fact that a technically sound assessment model
fails to yield an accurate picture of system effectiveness
if it is exercised under the wrong or incomplete circumstances.
A recent air defense evaluation (although not a simulation)
which reflects some of the recent methodological developments
is the Parametric Study of Advanced Forward Area Air Defense
Weapon System [Ref . 45] (AFAADS) which like TACOS II is
composed of submodels (Figure 4) , but is restricted by design
to forward area air defense systems although its methodology
could be used to evaluate missile systems as well. AFAADS
incorporated the WSEIAC scheme in the form of matrices to
describe operational states and substates. Using these
matrices in conjunction with a descriptive battlefield day
model, raid model, engagement model, and effectiveness model,
AFAADS generally provides a useful and productive evaluation.
The distinguishing feature of this study is the approach of
providing a set of effectiveness results corresponding to
possible enemy attack options.
23

In general, the trend in air defense evaluation has been
from one initially depicting a restricted, simplistic tactical
situation, characterized by a single value describing system
capability, to one depicting a broadly defined conflict,
described by a set of results related to a corresponding set
of enemy options. In spite of the developments in the area
of air defense evaluation, the conceptual weaknesses which
still exist raise doubts concerning the extent to which current
methodologies can accurately analyze air defense forces.
Critical review of the previous evaluations indicates that
current methodologies fail to account for some important
considerations related to air defense systems. Failure to
select the appropriate system, the right criteria, or an
incomplete description of the circumstances surrounding the
operation of an air defense system indicate the need for a
systematic means of identifying such facets. The methodology
proposed by this thesis is motivated by the need to address
these considerations and is intended to provide a logical
approach to them.
There are weaknesses associated with any military
evaluation and air defense evaluations, both of systems in
acquisition and of existing systems, are no exception. In
general, the weaknesses associated with air defense evaluation
can be related to two broad categories: (1) input deficiencies
and (2) methodological questions. These will be discussed in




The most refined air defense methodology will not
improve the usefulness of results that are based on data
that is suspect or cannot be verified. The first priority
of any evaluation must be to consider what data is available
and how it can be best used to support the evaluation task.
A concurrent issue related to input data is the considera-
tion of developing a methodology which matches availability
and credibility of the input data. A sophisticated method-
ology for which input data cannot be provided or generated
has no utility. Hence the user and the analyst must closely
coordinate the input formulation stage [Ref . 25] , to bridge
the gap and relate the detailed system characteristics or
measures of performance to a measure of mission success.
Few techniques exist which adequately accomplish this task.
The scenario is a key element because it drives the
entire analysis. When the scenario is altered by changes in
the mission or objectives the analysis may have greatly varying
results. As an example consider the possible difference in
results, casualties in this case, that would occur if a
defensive force that was entrenched and ordered to hold its
position, were given a different objective such as to delay
the attacking force trading space for time. Clearly we would
expect the delaying force to receive fewer casualties than
the force which attempted to hold its position and not yield
to the attacker. The implications of a scenario which is
25

designed without consideration of an important tactical
relationship is even more critical. In the case of most air
defense evaluations the failure to include friendly inter-
ceptor aircraft has to be regarded as a critical weakness
when their effect upon enemy forces and enemy tactics is
considered in addition to their contribution in support of
the accomplishment of the friendly mission.
Another often encountered scenario deficiency is the
failure to adequately incorporate friendly land combat forces
Air defense assets assigned to divisional units are primarily
low altitude, short-range weapons, and the disposition and
deployment of the land combat forces greatly affects the
location and effectiveness of the air defense weapons. This
may result in an unrealistic scenario since the type of
division may also affect the target priorities and the sortie
allocations of the enemy force. Failure to consider either
scenario deficiency may result in an unrealistic scenario
which in turn generates evaluation weaknesses.
An evaluation often includes many systems each possessing
different system characteristics. But system characteristics
can only assist the measurement of system performance. It is
the system as a whole which has an effect on individual or
collective evaluation outcomes. This is especially true with
air defense units because there are a large number of
dependent measures of performance which contribute to mission
success. Instead of a single vehicle with specified armament
26

and ordnance, it might be necessary to consider a system
which depends on several vehicles, several radars, processing
equipment and each round associated with its associated
launcer.
There are many other input deficiencies that contribute
to evaluation weaknesses such as target detection cases in
which weather and terrain masking and the lack of operationally
oriented data create problems. Likewise, new systems, tech-
niques and tactics involving design data rather than historical
or operational data create weaknesses and evaluation problems
during system acquisition. But even thorough consideration
of input data for a carefully constructed methodology has not
eliminated the persistent (i.e., those that one cannot
eliminate) uncertainties associated with the input deficiencies
discussed above. Scenario deficiencies and performance
measures that are dependent upon external factors (i.e.,
performance depends on threat, environment, etc.) can be
addressed by a methodology which considers the different
missions and tactical relationships that are present in
combat. This consideration is addressed by the proposed
methodology as a part of system description (Section IV A)
and system mission (Section IV B) . Although persistent
uncertainties may remain, the effect may be reduced by
considering a range of values to observe the variation in
outcomes. Sensitivity is also approached as a methodological




In addressing methodology questions related to evaluation
weaknesses an earlier statement relating carefully developed
methodology to faulty input can also be approached from the
opposite point of view: ineffective methodology can restrict
the usefulness of carefully developed, operationally oriented
input data. One of the most common methodological weaknesses
is the use of a one-sided methodology when combat is neces-
sarily a two-sided question. A one-sided methodology
describes the situation where one of the opposing forces is
fixed and the other force changes combat options or weapons
and force mix to evaluate the alternatives. An example, which
occurs frequently, is the evaluation with opposing tactics and
systems described by fairly accurate input data. Then the
friendly air defense systems and tactics are altered to
compare alternatives without changing the targets or flight
paths or priorities of the opposing force. This is clearly
an evaluation weakness because when one force changes its
systems or tactics, it has done so usually as a result of an
interaction with the opposing force; the same interaction
applies in principle, if not in detail to the opposing force.
The interaction is continuous and difficult to handle there-
fore many times it is neglected to keep the problem more
manageable. Failure to include the change in enemy tactics,
that is based upon a change in the perceived threat, is a
methodological weakness. The importance of a two-sided
28

evaluation can be seen by considering the determination of
optimal allocation of tactical resources for an attacker and
a defender. Assuming that the allocation decision is made
simultaneously by both decision makers without knowledge of
the opponent's exact course of action but taking into account
his possible allocations, this problem may be formulated as
a zero-sum game problem. This problem (in particular its
analytic formulation) is considered in Appendix A. It should
be clear from perusal of this simple example that potential
enemy courses of action must be considered in air defense
evaluations and are an integral part of the system effective-
ness study process. In other words, the return (payoff) to
each combatant depends on not only the friendly strategies
but also the enemy strategy. The final decision to have a
one-sided or two-sided evaluation will depend on the objectives
of the evaluation, but, if not included, the reasons for
accepting such a weakness should at least be documented.
Another methodology question which should be discussed is
the aggregation of submodels. One extreme would be to emplcy
a few highly specialized submodels aggregated into an overall
system model in the way TACOS approaches the problem. The
other extreme would be a single high resolution model which
describes and analyzes the entire tactical situation. The
*
Actually, one need only assume that, for example, the
attacker determines what his strategy should be without




highly aggregated method provides flexibility, to include
varying situations, and specialization, to focus on a
critical area, in a methodology but the user must deal with
submodel compatibility by functionally integrating the
information provided by each. The single unified model has
methodologically solved the integration problem, usually at
a higher initial cost, but it is less flexible and time
consuming to re-program for additional contingencies [Ref . 3]
.
All evaluations are necessarily limited to a maximum
number of systems and scenarios either by economic or design
considerations. Some of these limitations are handled by
using assumptions, which in turn, generate a number of "what
if..." questions. Sensitivity analysis can enhance evaluation
results by dealing with these questions. The extent of
sensitivity analysis should be considered methodologically
in the development stage where it can be related to evaluation
objectives and be designed to include the most critical, or
first order, effects [Ref. 25]. As an example, consider a
system which has an important characteristic of performance,
time to acquire a target, that has a wide range of possible
values. If the expected value were used to describe time to
acquire, when it was known to take on many values, there
would be a finite probability that the true value was
significantly different from the expected value. However,
if a range of values were used, an analyst could determine
the sensitivity of the results to changes in that range of
30

input values. If sensitivity is considered methodologically
in the formulation stage of an evaluation, the "what if"
questions can be incorporated into the overall evaluation
plan.
A large amount of uncertainties exist when combat is
evaluated, but many studies and evaluations are deterministic
and cannot adequately consider the risks associated with the
evaluation results. Consider the simplified WSEIAC example
earlier in this section. If the A, P,, and P. values were
deterministic quantities they would provide no measure of
risk associated with the effectiveness result. The method-
ological question of whether or not uncertainty should be
included is more easily answered than the question of how to
provide for it. It is desirable to reflect uncertainty if
possible, since it provides the user with more meaningful
results (i.e. an assessment of risk) to assist the decision-
making process. When included in the evaluation, uncertainty
may be incorporated as a part of sensitivity analysis where
probabilities are assigned to the input values for a single
iteration. Then, combining the results of all iterations
(runs), a distribution for the outcomes could be developed.
A more direct approach is to model uncertainty as an integral
part of the methodology through stochastic modeling or for
more complex systems (such as air defense systems) Monte





Throughout the life cycle of military systems a
particular piece of equipment or hardware is continually
evaluated to insure that it meets the needs of the service
by performing the tasks for which it was designed. On other
occasions an analyst is called upon to evaluate different
systems and to determine which is the "better" system. Many
different evaluations may be developed or used during this
period but each has as its goal to provide information whicl
will assist the decision makers. Over this ten, twenty, or
thirty year period planning decisions are made based upon
the evaluations of the system. The types of decisions may
vary but the evaluation will still be keyed to the system.
Decisions are continually made during system life, ini-
tially as a factor of system design and later as a part of
system modification and system improvement. Whether it is
the system or a specific piece of hardware, the requirement
is to compare and evaluate alternatives to provide a basis
for the decision-making process. Planning decisions are
involved with system design and development. Design decisions
are made throughout the pre-production phases and also during
prototype development. Other planning decisions are considered
during procurement and production of a system and at this
stage planning decisions are of particular importance since
32

it is necessary to determine how many systems to produce.
The planning decisions which are considered during the
operational life of the system are based on weapon system
evaluations. A frequent criterion used to conduct weapon
system evaluations and assist in planning decisions is
system effectiveness. System effectiveness measurement
provides a means of evaluating air defense systems in terms
of how well the system meets its objectives.
B. ELEMENTS OF SYSTEM EFFECTIVENESS
Choosing the better system is a difficult task in the
planning process. A system's effectiveness is used by
analysts as the criterion for comparing alternative systems.
If the effectiveness of a military system is considered to be
the extent of success to which the system may be expected to
achieve a set of objectives, then a conceptual definition has
been formulated. Since this qualitative statement cannot
easily be measured, a quantitative expression is needed that
more precisely defines a system's effectiveness. This is
done by developing an operational definition for the abstract
concept, where an event (that can be measured) is chosen to
represent the concept. Development of an operational
definition must be accomplished by addressing the key elements
upon which system effectiveness depends.
The key elements are "military" system", "set of
objectives", and "extent of success". It is necessary to
define clearly the system to be evaluated. This task is
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often difficult because the system being evaluated may
depend upon the operation of subordinate systems, adjacent
systems or parent systems (Figure 5) . For example, if we
evaluate an air defense battalion the parent system might
be an air defense brigade while the subordinate system would
be the firing batteries which form the battalion. Similarly,
if the brigade were the evaluated system, then the air
defense region would be the parent system and the battalions
would be the subordinate systems. It is often the case that
we design systems to provide mutual interactive support and
to operate as a subcomponent of a large system. Missile
batteries, for example, interact strongly, which may be seen
by considering the fact that they have overlapping zones of
radar coverage and alternate primary search areas in the
event that an adjacent unit is out of action. These same
batteries , when aggregated into a larger system form a
defense in depth based on the coverage provided by successive
units . Gun systems also provide mutual support by sharing
early warning information among the units and by their deploy-
ment in pairs which enables a weapon to reload or repair
while another system provides protection. For this reason
it is necessary to clearly define the system to be evaluated,
since narrowly describing a system in terms of subordinate
systems may lead to suboptimization problems and describing
the system in terms of the broader parent system may also be






















An essential part of defining the system to be evaluated
is the description of the particular system and how it
operates. Understanding how the system operates leads to a
more reasonable set of system objectives which is another key
element in developing system effectiveness (Figure 6) . By
operation we mean how the system mechanically performs and
how it is employed or used.
Obtaining system objectives is another important task in
the development of system effectiveness. These objectives
are determined judg-mentally by analysts and are based upon
the best information available. This requires an in-depth
study of warfare and a study of conflict to determine the
key objectives of the military system in combat and how the
extent to which the objectives are met might be measured.
If it is possible to specify the mission in a clear and
precise manner, the objectives may be determined by logically
translating the system mission into a set of desired outcomes.
Careful evaluation of each portion of the system mission may
identify both explicit and implicit mission requirements.
The explicit element of the mission is usually concerned with
the overall objectives of the system, whereas the implicit
element though not stated in the system mission, are objectives
which must be accomplished in some measure to insure that the
overall objective is achieved. For example, the localized
defeat of an enemy force may be an explicit objective, but























negotiating a river crossing and a certain minimum level of
force attrition which were not specified in the mission
statement. Therefore it is necessary to represent the system
and its objectives operationally to provide a concrete
situation that will stand for an abstract concept.
The translation of system mission into a set of objectives
becomes a consideration of the level of detail. Successful
development of the objectives depends greatly on how
thoroughly the mission is analyzed. Combining the mission
analysis with the system description and system definition
should generally provide a reasonable set of objectives
enabling an analyst to develop a qualitative effectiveness
concept, especially if the nature of military conflict is
well understood.
When a military system is defined and has a specific set
of objectives associated with its operation it is assumed
that there is a threat, or at least a postulated threat, that
must be considered and any development or discussion of system
effectiveness must be relative to the threat. The threat is
of great importance because it generates the targets and
tactics for conflict assessment (Figure 6) ; this is necessary
if a concrete situation is to be developed in place of the
abstract concept. The threat is also important because one
objective of the air defense forces is to protect vital assets
by neutralizing the threat. Additionally, the threat provides
different types of threat vehicles, tactics, objectives and
the timesequencing of these factors for conflict assessment.
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Clearly, then, it is necessary to develop the known or
postulated threat which confronts the system to be evaluated.
The threat can usually be developed in terms of enemy
objectives, forces and tactics [Ref. 17]. If a threat
exists or is perceived to exist then forces are assumed to
be associated with that threat and likewise the existence of
forces implies that there are missions assigned to those
forces. The missions may be related to threat objectives
and the operation of the forces implies the existence of
tactics which are used by the enemy.
The opposing forces, each with a method of operation and
a set of objectives, have one element in common, namely, the
combat environment where they both must exist and operate.
Although the combat environment is common to both forces, its
effect upon the opposing forces may be quite different,
depending greatly on the composition of the forces and their
individual objectives. Clearly, the terrain, weather,
logistics and other combat environment factors will affect
opposing forces in different ways. Once the combat environ-
ment is developed, and represented in conjunction with the
opposing forces and their objectives we have the basic factors
upon which system effectivenss depends.
Combat forces, their objectives and the combat environment
provide the analyst with the ability to evaluate an abstract
concept such as system effectiveness in terms of an event,
the tactical scenario, which can be measured either
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qualitatively or quantitatively. If in fact the tactical
scenario does enable a concept to be represented and measured,
then that concept has been operationally defined. The
decision-maker or user must exercise careful judgement to
determine the appropriateness of the factors upon which the
tactical scenario depends. Of particular importance are
those factors which describe the threat, because the objectives,
forces and tactics of the opposing military systems are
largely based upon synthesized intelligence data and perceived
intentions. The tactical scenario may or may not be
sensitive to these factors and the user must be cautious in
determining their appropriateness. War gaming is one method
in use which assists in determining the appropriateness of
possible intentions.
The remaining portion of system effectiveness to be
considered is the key element "extent of success" . This
element is evaluated by combining the results of an assessed
tactical scenario with selected measures of effectiveness.
Many means of assessment might be used to derive results from
a tactical scenario, but often the "extent of success" and
how to assess it is an unresolved problem in its own right
[Ref. 17]. Parametric analysis of critical events might be
one way of determining scenario outcomes . Another method
would be to use assessment models or computerized routines
of either a deterministic or a stochastic process to assess
the conflict. Or perhaps quantified or qualified judgement
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might assess other facets of the tactical scenario which do
not lend themselves easily to other forms of assessment.
The utility of operations research depends greatly on the
appropriateness of the criteria by which the system is judged
or compared. In determining the "extent of success" achieved
by a system, selecting wrong criteria is tantamount to
answering the wrong question. Similarly, using the wrong
criteria can also result in an inappropriate assessment of
system effectiveness. The desired criteria are those which
enable an analyst to quantitatively experss the extent to
which a mission requirements are attained by the system.
Measures of effectiveness may be drawn from two primary
sources; they may be taken from doctrine or more likely derived
from system objectives. When drawn from tactical doctrine we
might expect the measures to be general in nature, since
doctrine is based upon a broad and generalized view of conflict.
On the other hand, those measures of effectiveness derived
from system objectives are developed by quantifying previously
conceived qualitative effectiveness concepts. For example,
if the objective is to protect critical assets from enemy
air attack it might be possible to quantify the effectiveness
concept in terms of the number of assets that survive the
attack and the cost to the enemy in planes of destroying one
of the assets. If the result of quantifying these concepts
is an expression of the extent to which specific system
objectives are achieved, then, by definition, we have a
suitable measure of effectiveness.
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When the assessed results and measures of effectiveness
are combined in an effort to describe overall system effective-
ness, it is desirable to formulate an effectiveness function
which will identify specific contributions to mission success.
Consider the critical asset example once more; if we desire
to formulate an effectiveness function we might very well
desire a common measure. One such measure might be to use
the dollar cost of assets and planes to obtain the function;
other surrogatejneasure s might be more meaningful such as tons
of ordnance or the number of casualties. If the measures of
effectiveness yield a quantitative expression of the extent
to which system objectives are achieved and if the assessed
results provide a quantitative description of significant
variables then there exists an effectiveness function to
describe the extent to which the system has achieved a set
of objectives. This function will allow the analyst to
calculate a value with which system effectiveness may be
expressed.
In discussing system effectiveness the key elements of
the definition were examined and related to system description,
mission, threat and combat environment. The next task is to
translate these four major factors upon which system effec-




IV. METHODOLOGY FOR AIR DEFENSE
R. Ackoff has emphasized [Ref. 1] that the objective of
methodology is the improvement of procedures and criteria
employed in research. The emphasis in this section is focused
on a systematic procedure for examining air defense systems
in terms of the major factors of system effectiveness identified
in Section III. The geometric aspects of air defense employment
are illustrated in a two-dimensional representation of a three-
dimensional problem. Short range air defense units (SHORAD)
,
which are assigned to divisions are employed on or near the
forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) . Low-medium attitude
air defense units (LOMAD) and high-medium attitude units
(HIMAD) are less mobile than SHORAD units and are deployed in
rear areas. This basic structure does not preclude mixing the
assets (e.g. SHORAD deployed around an airbase) but does give
a general representation of the disposition and relationship
among air defense assets.
A. SYSTEM DESCRIPTION
Defining and describing the air defense system to be
evaluated must begin with a decision on the system level. To
define the system the overall goal of the evaluation should
be known in general. An example might be to desire to
investigate the effect two additional missile battalions would
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possible targets; or, perhaps, the effect that a new weapon
might have in a similar situation. Referring back to Figure
5 this means that the system which is selected for evaluation
determines the level of evaluation, the parent system and
likewise the subordinate system. Identification of the
system is an essential step because the parent and subordinate
systems will affect many of the implicit objectives of the
chosen system later in the evaluation.
Consider the missile storage problem discussed in Section
I [Ref
.
2 8] . It was pointed out that selection of the wrong
system level produced results that did not answer the issue
being addressed. In this case the results were inconclusive,
which -indicated there was a problem. In other situations the
results might answer the wrong question or lead to the
selection of an undesirable alternative. Another point to
consider is the possible consequence that selection of the
wrong system level may often lead to choosing inappropriate
measures of effectiveness.
In selecting the system to be evaluated it is important
to note that the air war which air defense assets must support
is not a localized conflict. It is conducted over a broad
front often with primary interest focused upon strategic
objectives rather than tactical considerations. This must be
kept in mind when selecting an air defense system evaluation
level because failure to recognize this fact may lead to
suboptimization problems. Motivation for evaluating over a
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broad front with more general objectives may be generated
by considering the attack-defense game described in Appendix
A. This simple problem provides valuable insights to the
allocation of air defense assets. The optimal allocation
strategies for attacker and defender, respectively, are a
concentrated attack at a randomly selected point of the
defense, and a "proportional value" defense. Extrapolating
this game theoretic result to the real world one would expect
the attacker to saturate air defenses at selected points.
Therefore at the battery or individual fire unit level (i.e.,
subordinate system) it would be expected that the attacker
will overload or not engage individual fire units. Conse-
quently, it does not appear appropriate to evaluate air
defense at the fire unit level, since units here are either
saturated or not engaged. Details of the attack-defense
game are given in Appendix A.
Once the system is identified and selected, the system
description task has begun since the level at which the air
defense assets are defined influences the relative signifi-
cance of some of the elements pertaining to system
description (Figure 8)
.
There are many ways that a system might be described and
Figure 8 depicts those ways which are most common to air
defense systems. Vulnerability, flexibility and survivability
are facets of system description which are often quite
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and its evaluation. The vulnerability of an air defense
system is important because nearly all enemy courses of
action would include air defense suppression, which will be
assumed here to mean damaged or destroyed in addition to
jamming of electronic devices. Therefore system vulnerability
to electronic countermeasures (ECM) , stand-off suppression,
using anti-radiation missiles (ARM) and air to surface
missiles (ASM) , in addition to conventional ordnance are all
means of describing an air defense system. The flexibility
of a system is a consideration in system description because
changes of mission, locale, or mode of operation are realistic
situations which must be accounted for since they influence
other factors such as system capabilities and limitations.
System survivability is a subtle but important portion of
system description because there may exist force levels at
which the entire air defense system is sensitive to the loss
or survival of an additional fire unit.
The major elements of system description are capability,
limitations and compatibility. Simply stated, these factors
might correspond to what the system can do, what it cannot do,
and how it relates to the overall conflict. Capability, that
is described by system performance, is probably the most
common indicator of a system because it involves the more
quantifiable and available information. This is indeed an
important part of describing the system but it can also be
misleading if it is not considered in conjunction with
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limitations and compatibility. The limitations of a system
can have a significant effect on the evaluation of a system
by the manner in which they reduce the system capabilities.
Considerations such as engagement time, reload time, rules
of engagement and saturation levels provide a measurable and
realistic input to system description. Compatibility, unlike
capability and limitations is much more difficult to quantify,
yet it is a key ingredient which provides relevant information
with which a system may be described. In a general sense,
compatibility might be called the ability of an air defense
system to interface with ground combat forces and air warfare
assets and to support both. This consideration identifies
the need to exercise effective command and control over the
high, medium and low altitude roles assumed by the individual
fire units and emphasizes the requirements for an effective
communication interface.
A careful description of "the system", as outlined in
Figure 8, will assist the analyst in formulating an effective-
ness concept. This is necessary if a quantitative expression
is to be developed as a part of an operational definition.
Clearly, the system must be known in terms of the elements
of Figure 8 if it is to be assessed in terms of its military
value.
As an example of the system description factors that have
been discussed consider the simplified situation in Figure 9







defense sector boundaries, an attacking aircraft (D) , and
a friendly interceptor (E) . If the evaluation of this situa-
tion depended only upon system capability aircraft D might
very well be a certain victim of either A, B or C. However,
the limitations and compatibility factors can significantly
alter even the simplest situation in such a way that it is
unreasonable to address the outcome in terms of one round
versus one plane. In realistically describing this situation
we must know if A, B or C are operating or if one is reloading
or another has insufficient engagement time. It is necessary
to know if there exists a weapons restriction such as a hold
fire or whether the vectored interceptor E has priority of
engagement. Constraints of this type are realistic and
certainly attenuate the simple consideration of aircraft
capability versus air defense system capability. But these
same limitations and compatibility factors also preserve
ordnance and prevent accidents to friendly assets by coor-
dinating the fires of units such as those depicted.
The actual extent to which any or all of these factors
of system description should be included in an air defense
evaluation will be determined by the evaluation objectives
and the ability of the analyst to quantify the factors as
meaningful input. But it is important to recognize that
this is one portion of a study that usually can be quantified
and care should be exercised not to overlook or hastily
eliminate one of the factors as a source of system description.
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A good example of system description is contained in
the Advanced Forward Area Air Defense Study of Litton Systems
Division [Ref. 45] where nearly every element described in
Figure 8 was considered and quantified in careful detail.
In general this is not done in such detail because compre-
hensive descriptions are costly. However/ this study evalu-
ated several evenly matched and highly competitive systems
in an attempt to determine the most effective. Careful sys-
tem description was essential in this case to adequately
distinguish one system from another, whereas alternative
study objectives might have resulted in a different approach
to system description.
B. SYSTEM MISSION
The next key element in developing a system effective-
ness framework for air defense is to translate the mission
(given in Section IIA) of the system into concrete sets of
system objectives. Recall the general discussion of system
effectiveness where the mission was analyzed in terms of
explicit and implicit mission requirements. In dealing
with air defense missions consideration of both air warfare
and ground combat requirements is important. There are also
a wide range of missions that might be undertaken. The
multitude of missions translates to an equally large number
of system objectives and the usual problems of multicriteria
decision making [Ref. 35]
.
An example of the difficulties involved with multiple
criteria, consider the situation of three measures of
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effectiveness corresponding to three alternatives, each
evaluated with respect to three criteria. The alternatives
and criteria provide nine situations to be addressed by each
measure (3) resulting in twenty seven values for consideration.
If one alternative fails to dominate the others, then a trade-
off or aggregation problem must be solved. Another approach
might be to reduce the number of criteria or weight of their
relative performance. There are many approaches that might
be taken by an analyst, but the important consideration at
this stage of developing system effectiveness is to identify
and address the appropriate objectives.
The objectives are related to several different categories
which may or may not be mutually exhaustive depending on the
scope of the evaluation effort (Figure 10) . Some of the
objectives can be related to air defense doctrine which states
that the air defense mission is to destroy, nullify or reduce
the effectiveness of enemy offensive air efforts to a level
permitting freedom of action for friendly forces. These
doctrinal statements, although general in nature, are reflected
in the framework of Figure 10 and are applicable to all air
defense evaluations in some degree. However, other categories
contain objectives which are not derived from doctrine but are
obtained from implicit considerations associated with system
missions and objectives.
Earlier when system effectiveness was discussed in general
the translation of mission requirements into a set of system
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associated with the mission. The explicit requirements are
generally those which include objectives in relation to enemy
forces and in relation to friendly forces. These are essen-
tially a more precise restating of the doctrine considerations
Examples of this, from Figure 10, would be inflicting aircraft
kills and damage as well as mission aborts upon the enemy and
supporting the friendly efforts by protecting vital assets
and insuring freedom of movement for friendly forces.
The objectives related to compatibility, flexibility and
limitations are derived from their corresponding system
descriptors. These objectives are included for the purpose
of recognizing system problems and difficulties and attempting
to reduce or offset the effects of their influence. Often
these objectives are implicit requirements that exist as a
result of the operational deployment. An example might be
the effect on available engagement time that terrain masking
causes by virtue of the deployment of a system.
Maintaining a continuous combat posture is a combination
of explicit doctrine and implicit requirements and is a key
objective in system evaluation. Combat posture is composed
of several elements including the reliability, availability
and maintainability of a system. These are valid considera-
tions because of the ability they provide an analyst to be
precise when evaluating a system. It is possible to talk in
terms of fire units in a system that are fully operational,
those that are degraded and others that are non-operational,
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instead of relying on a single number which relfects the
total number of pieces of equipment.
Precisely stated objectives, combined with the system
definition and description, form the basis of the qualitative
effectiveness concept needed to operationally define system
effectiveness for an evaluation.
If, for example, the air defense system was the Air
Defense Brigade, including high, medium, and low altitude fire
units, and the stated objective was to protect friendly assets
from enemy air attack, then a basis would exist for the
development of a qualitative effectiveness concept for air
defense. It might be stated as the degree of protection from
enemy air attack provided to friendly combat forces and key
assets with the designated area of brigade responsibility.
It should be pointed out, when considering the system
objectives for an air defense evaluation, that the requirement
for air defense assets to support both the air war and ground
combat indicates that the objectives must necessarily be
determined at a large aggregated combat system. The objectives
assigned interceptor aircraft, in the conduct of the air war
over friendly forces, are determined by the Tactical Air Force
which corresponds roughly to an Air Defense Region. When
objectives are determined at this level it might appear that
less than adequate support exists for the ground combat plan
when air defense assets are assigned to lower level combat
forces. However the resultant effect is the avoidance of
suboptimization . This raises the question of whether or not
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air defense systems should be operationally evaluated at the
lower organizational levels. This question is discussed
further in Section VI.
C. THREAT
It was mentioned earlier that conflict, by definition,
implies opposing forces. Therefore the threat which opposes
the system must be developed to assess system effectiveness.
The threat must be accepted as an element of the evaluation
that is surrounded by uncertainty, because although it may be
based upon intelligence information, judgement is always
exercised with respect to its appropriateness. The threat is
developed in terms of the objectives forces and tactics of
the enemy because these are the basic elements of a tactical
scenario which is needed for an evaluation (Figure 11) [Ref . 17]
The threat allows the analyst to generate, through the
tactical scenario, the enemy penetrators (targets) that will
test the ability of the air defense system to protect
friendly assets and to influence their survival.
There are other elements which can be used to develop
the threat but most of them could generally be categorized
within one of the elements of Figure 11.
The target objectives may generate flight profiles to
be flown through the air defense system and may determine
where and how the enemy aircraft will suppress the air defense
assets or avoid defensive strong points by indirect avenues


























damage levels, the maximum acceptable attrition and the
enemy desire to influence our own actions, enough information
should be available to provide a selective set of reasonable
enemy objectives to the analyst for evaluation work.
The force considerations that are needed will depend on
the level at which the selected system is evaluated, but in
general the strength, deployment and organization of enemy
systems and their associated capabilities are necessary infor-
mation to provide a reasonable set of possible threat situa-
tions. One of the more important considerations involves the
threat tactics since an air defense evaluation is usually
developed around a friendly defensive posture. For this
reason enemy tactics and employment guidelines are of great
importance since the set of attack options and associated
tactics will have a significant effect on the overall evalua-
tion. Again, wargaming can help identify which attack options
and tactics should be considered.
Development of threat for an evaluation is then the
combination of objectives, forces and tactics. These in turn
may be translated into penetrator flight profiles, generation
of penetrators , and avenues of approach which are inputs into
assessment models. The information is then translated judge-
mentally and quantitatively into a set of combat options with
which the system to be evaluated must contend. This is part




If the objective for the friendly air defense system is
to protect friendly assets, and if the enemy objective is
to "win" the ground conflict and the destruction of friendly
assets such as ammunition supply dumps, airbases, headquar-
ters, etc. are a means to this end, then air defense system
effectiveness would be made operational by formulating
specific avenues of approach (A, B, and C) flight profiles
(a, b, c) , aircraft types (1, 2, 3, 4) and target priorities
(air bases, armor, air defense, headquarters). This infor-
mation, when quantified (weighted, ranked, stochastically
conditioned, etc.) and incorporated into the tactical scen-
ario provides the set of enemy combat options to test the
air defense system.
One study which was successful in the threat development
for an evaluation was the Air Defense Evaluation - 1980
[Ref. 39]. This study developed in detail the threat systems,
their capabilities and the employment of those systems in
a projected threat situation. The result was a well defined
set of combat options based upon quantitative enemy system
information and judgemental threat considerations which
allowed a detailed analysis of friendly system requirements.
D. COMBAT ENVIRONMENT
The last evaluation requirement is the development of
the combat environment. The environment in which the con-
flict takes place is important in an evaluation context for
two reasons. First the combat environment together with the
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system description will enable the analyst to determine the
operational system states. The environment, in general,
and weather, ECM, terrain and support, in particular, affects
the system states. Second, the combat environment is needed
together with the forces and mission as a key element of the
tactical scenario which drives the evaluation effort. There
are many elements which contribute to the combat environment
most of which logically fall into one of the categories of
Figure 12. The economic factors and nature of conflict are
usually determined at a level beyond the evaluation, but the
effect of these elements can be significant in the evaluation
An obvious example would be the consideration of a nuclear
environment which would lead to different tactics and troop
dispositions; likewise the consideration of a valuable
resource could influence the environment.
When a combat environment is usually given consideration
the primary emphasis is on weather and terrain because of
the masking and mobility effects of terrain and the degraded
operation of many systems in adverse weather. But air
defense evaluations must be concerned even more with the
effects of ECM/ECCM whether it originates from an airborne
or ground based system. No enemy capable of generating a
potent air attack will risk the loss of costly and sophis-
ticated aircraft in a benign tactical environment. If air
defense systems are present in the conflict; it should be











































level and an evaluation of an air defense system should
reflect this assumption in the development of the combat
environment.
E. EVALUATION PROCESS
The combat forces, the missions and the combat environ-
ment provide the necessary elements of a tactical scenario.
The tactical scenario, in turn, may be considered to opera-
tionally define system effectiveness: the scenario provides
what is to be observed, under what conditions, and the
operations to be performed. How the observations are to
be made and how they are to be measured and handled must
be included in the system effectiveness evaluation. Com-
bining the results of an assessed tactical scenario with
selected measures of effectiveness yields an assessment of
system effectiveness. The conflict results of a tactical
scenario can come from several means, including parametric
analysis, system indices, deterministic or stochastic models
and finally from the judgement of the analyst or the user.
Figure 13 depicts graphically the main elements of the
evaluation process; the system, objectives, threat and com-
bat environment generate possible operational and non-opera-
tional system states. The combat environment also combines
with the threat information to form a set of enemy combat
options to exercise in opposition to the friendly system.
From the non-operational and operational states, reliability,
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and when influenced by enemy combat options, which degrade
the parameters, system dependability is formulated.
Consider as an example a theater-level combat operation
in which air defense, ground forces, and interceptors are
opposed by attacking enemy aircraft. The ground forces
are deployed tactically in a defensive posture, the air
defense assets are uniformly distributed and the interceptors
are on runway alert. The air defense effectiveness concept
is the protection of friendly assets and the enemy, using a
low flight profile has the objective of destroying selected
targets while advancing on two avenues of approach. The
combat environment is benign (no ECM/ECCM)
.
Following Figure 13, the system (theater-level air defense)
is selected and described. The threat is also developed and
in conjunction with the environment the enemy combat options
stated. Knowledge of the friendly system allows development
of the system states and the reliability, availability, and
maintainability information. Assume for this example that
all systems are fully operational. At this point the tactical
scenario is begun and conflict assessment is initiated.
Conflict assessment may include a series of assessment
models which evaluate target acquisition, tracking, identi-
fication, deception and other elements of an engagement.
Assessment also involves bookkeeping, which includes such
measures of conflict as the number of subordinate systems
suppressed or destroyed, surviving assets, damage to the
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system, enemy aircraft killed, damaged or diverted and other
measures that describe the conflict.
The work that Braddock Dunn and McDonald, Inc. has done
with its Tactical Air Defense Computer Operational Simulation
(TACOS) is a good example of conflict assessment [Ref . 5]
.
TACOS utilizes a highly modular approach to portray the
critical events and system interactions. The output of the
conflict assessment is a battle history and a summary of the
conflict statistics.
Returning to the example on page 65 assume the enemy
attacks on the two approaches and is engaged by low altitude
air defense assets. The enemy has achieved local superiority
by concentrating his forces but the attrition forces the
attackers to a medium altitude profile. The attack aircraft
are passed through air defense channels to a medium altitude
missile system, indicating successful control and coordina-
tion. At the same time interceptors are scrambled and vectored
toward the enemy aircraft. Upon interceptor arrival the
missile units transfer the mission to the interceptors,
resulting in an additional interface success and the destruc-
tion of the remaining attackers.
The battle history of this example provides a great deal
of information concerning the effectiveness of the air defense
system. Local defeat (saturation of these air defense systems)
did not adversely affect the friendly forces theater-level
operations, hence we might assume tentatively that the right
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system was selected. The appropriate relationships between
friendly and enemy actions were depicted, and the interfaces
and interactions among complementary subsystems were accounted
for in this example.
Conflict assessment results provide quantitative informa-
tion which must be handled and treated in such a way that the
effort supports the goal of system evaluation. The quanti-
tative results are an indication of how the system performed
in combat, but more information is needed when system effec-
tiveness is sought. If the system effectiveness is the extent
to which the system attains a set of objectives, then a
quantitative expression of assessment results as the extent
of attained objectives is what we desire; this is called a
measure of effectiveness.
If in the previous example, the fraction of surviving
friendly air defense assets was chosen to be the measure of
effectiveness then the system effectiveness for this iteration
of the evaluation would be maximized.
Measures of effectivenss were discussed earlier in terms
of their development from doctrine and from system objectives
where an attempt is made to quantify a qualitative effective-
ness concept. The selection of measures of effectiveness is
one of the most important steps in an evaluation and could
easily be considered as a separate problem for study. It is
particularly important in an air defense evaluation since
the analyst is often faced with multiple measures of effective-
ness. There is rarely a single criterion or a common
67

denominator for air defense evaluations. Hence , in such an
evaluation effort a choice must be made selecting those
measures which accurately reflect the effectiveness of the
system being evaluated. Rather than approach measures of
effectiveness from a theoretical basis, a few heuristic
arguments related to air defense evaluation should emphasize
how critical this step is.
While much attention is given the problem of suboptimi-
zation in studies, the selection of the wrong measures of
effectiveness can have equally disastrous effects by focusing
on the wrong effectiveness criteria. The results may vary
from not answering the original question but a different
question to not answering any question at all. A classic
example of using the wrong measure of effectiveness is
contained in Methods of Operations Research [Ref . 27]
,
where Morse and Kimbal discussed the case of British merchant
vessels in the Mediterranean that were subjected to damaging
aircraft attacks in World War II. When the ships were
equipped with antiaircraft guns it was observed that in only
4% of the air attacks was the plane shot down. Serious
consideration was given to the possibility of removing the
guns to employ them where they were needed more and could
be used more effectively. Closer observation revealed that
the original purpose of the guns was to protect the ship,
not to shoot down attacking aircraft. When the situation
was measured in terms of a ship surviving an attack with
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less damage than an unarmed ship, the guns were considered
extremely effective.
This historical example, in the context of modern air
defense systems, reinforces the point that aircraft kills
is a poor measure of effectiveness if the mission and objec-
tive of the system is to protect friendly assets. There are
many additional ways an asset might survive other than as
the result of an aircraft kill: enemy mission abort,
undesirable attack profile or less effective ordnance
delivery.
Another consideration for measures of effectiveness is
the manner in which they are aggregated or weighted in terms
of their importance. In the case of a single criterion
this presents no problem. However when dealing with many
measures of effectiveness it is important to identify those
which are the most critical in determining system effective-
ness. Often the identification or selection is a judgement
that is made by those performing the evaluation. In other
cases expert opinion is considered or the decision maker
is asked which measures are most important. Many means of
selection might be used and one example would be the use of
the method of successive intervals [Ref. 37], where subjective
values of attributes given by individuals can be developed
into an interval scale relationship providing rank order
and unit of measure. This tool would be particularly useful
in an air defense evaluation where the evaluations of many
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could be ranked by this method; the unit of measure would
also provide information on how much more important one
measure might be than another. Whatever means might be
used to select the appropriate measures of effectiveness
it is often the most important decision in analysis and
should be allocated a commensurate amount of effort.
When determining overall system effectiveness it is
desirable to develop an effectiveness function which will
yield a meaningful measurement of system effectiveness for
an alternative which may be compared to others; or to com-
pare several alternatives at the same time. An important
consideration at this point is the system that is being
evaluated. If the system is defined to be a battery or
fire unit then the WSEIAC scheme might produce the results
desired, but if the system operates at a level such as the
Air Defense Region or theater level then nature's options,
the enemy options and the defensive effectiveness interacting
with the enemy and nature must be considered in terms of
aggregated measures of effectiveness. Evaluations at aggre-
gated levels are normally complex, in which case the impor-
tant measures of effectiveness should be selected, aggregated
and combined with the battle histories or assessment informa-
tion to achieve an indication of system effectiveness.
Additional consideration should be given to the level
of detail that system effectiveness provides. If the assess-
ment results are generated in significant detail, then care
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should be taken so that effectiveness functions will not
be over-simplified. Likewise, general results should not
be displayed or transformed into system effectiveness through
analytical overkill. As an example consider assessed results
that are prepared in great detail; if this information is
translated into a binary decision variable, then the infor-
mative content of that data is lost and the evaluation may
be misleading. Likewise, it is also misleading to express
effectiveness results in greater detail than the study can
support.
In determining and displaying system effectiveness, the
overriding consideration must be whether or not the process
provides a comparison of alternatives to assist the decision-
making effort. This judgement is obviously more accurately
determined by hindsight, but the essential question should
be addressed by the analyst simply asking himself what




V. DIFFICULTIES OF EVALUATION METHODOLOGY
The system effectiveness methodology developed for air
defense has certain factors which are of interest in an
evaluation but are difficult to include and handle. One of
the most difficult factors is the interface of other systems,
where an overlap of responsibilities or capabilities requires
coordination and control of the systems to avoid over-
allocation of assets in some areas and to avoid leaving
other areas deficient in defensive capabilities. Command,
3
control and communication (C ) is a critical area which
deserves attention in operational defense exercises, and
remains a problem area in the current state-of-the-art. An
example of a key interface is the Air Defense-Air Force
boundaries in a defensive posture. The low altitude Air
Defense assets operate primarily by themselves and coordinate
with ground forces rather than the Air Force. However,
medium and high altitude assets in an air defense system are
under the operational control of the Air Force. Effective
control and allocation of effort is a complex task in reality
and equally so in an evaluation effort. Consider the control
of vectored interceptors and alerted missile units operating
against penetrating aircraft, where a decision must be made
to hold the missile engagement and continue with interceptors
or to redirect the interceptors and allow the missile units
to engage. This is clearly a case of overlapping responsibility
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where the interface of friendly assets must be controlled
to prevent excess expenditure of ordnance and also damage
to friendly aircraft.
Another interface is that of divisional and non-division
air defense assets which may be visualized by referring to
Figure 7. Low altitude systems assigned to divisions must
interface with non-division air defense assets and with the
ground forces. While supporting the overall ground plan of
operation, the low altitude systems must coordinate with
missile units operating in rear areas to provide coordinated
defense in depth across organizational and operational boun-
daries. When dealing with an area as complex as system
interfaces, the contribution of field exercises and taped
command and control exercises is significant. It provides
information that is normally not available, except at great
cost, through probabilistic or simulation methods. Analysis
of this data can provide information for evaluations that
otherwise may not be available.
In addition to interfaces or boundaries as an evaluation
factor, the interactions or actions on each other are also
considered. This becomes a rather fine distinction in
general, but specifically there are asset interactions which
contribute to system evaluation. Interactions among air
defense fire units are usually well-handled because the
operation of these units is well understood. For example,
the effect of a unit that is out of action is well defined
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in terms of realigned sectors of responsibility, and command
and control is designed to provide efficient allocation of
fires. But at higher levels where the interactions are
between more aggregated systems or even between services, the
effect they have on each other is not clearly defined and
not easily evaluated.
The interface of interceptors and missiles was discussed
as a tactical allocation problem earlier, but an interaction
or effect also takes place in such a situation. When inter-
ceptors are given priority to engage the missile units must
hold their fire, and the time spent waiting may cause the
missile systems to engage at less than optimal range or
perhaps not at all. Another interaction between these same
forces arises when interceptors, due to their flexibility,
are used in a distant locale within the system area and
cannot respond on short notice to the needs of missile sys-
tems for back up support or to drive off enemy suppression
aircraft
.
Each interaction provides an individual result that may
have synergistic or antagonistic effects between the systems
.
One way of handling these interactions might be to consider
them as a set of stylized joint deployments, where the inter-
action effects may be analyzed separately (for example the
antagonistic category of a hold fire command assigned to a
missile system to allow intercepter engagement which reduces




A relative frequency of the effects might be constructed
and a quantitative expression could be developed from Monte
Carlo methods
.
The interdependence of systems is a key factor in
analyzing an evaluation framework, particularly at higher
levels of systems. Complex air and ground force systems
are composed of highly interdependent sybsystems which all
but eliminates distinction between independent and dependent
variables. According to reference 34 / the analytical task
then becomes one of identifying self-contained sets of rela-
tionships that can be treated independently. If no such sets
exist then the task becomes subjective or judgemental which
involves the difficulty of non-quantification of relationships
or of justifying a derived quantitative relationship. In
some cases the answer is to treat the interdependent systems
separately, ignoring the contributions of lesser systems.
When this is done the results may be viewed as relative
measures, rather than an absolute outcome, subject to the
higher order effects caused by lesser systems.
Earlier, uncertainty was discussed primarily in terms of
input data which is often reflected in the results of an
evaluation. There are other forms that uncertainty may take
and according to Hitch and McKean [Ref. 19] the best advice
is to include uncertainty, attempting to identify the major
areas, and try to reflect them in the analysis. Some of the
major areas of uncertainty are the assumptions, the enemy
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and his reactions, technological uncertainty, statistical
uncertainty and, of course, the human factors associated with
the evaluation.
Within the Air Defense methodology the enemy and his
reactions are perhaps the most important uncertainty factora,
since the enemy options and tactics will vary greatly depen-
ding on how effective the friendly defensive systems are
at countering the latest combat option. The other element
of uncertainty that becomes important is how the air defense
system will function under stress. This is an element of
great uncertainty since there exists no combat data to
support or deny the empirical claim of the industries which
produced the systems or the service that generated the
requirement for the system.
The advice to include uncertainty can prove to be very
costly since the number of cases to analyze and compute
increases as the power of the factors that are permitted to
vary [Ref. 12]. For example, if there were two uncertain
factors and each was permitted to take four values, the
2
number of cases is 4 or 16. But if ten uncertain factors
were permitted to take four values the number of cases would
be over 1,000,000 and the cost constraint would be reached
quite rapidly. Clearly, the need to consider all interesting
cases must be tempered by the economic constraints and time
constraints that apply to a given study.
3When discussing how the difficult factors such as C
,
which affect the methodology, should be handled the first
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consideration is whether they can be quantified. If so,
a determination should be made concerning the advantage or
net gain supplied to the evaluation relative to incorporating
the factor as a qualification or judgemental consideration.
The next decision would be to determine where within the
methodology the difficult factor should be addressed. If
the factor is quantified and included as an input the com-
plexity of the evaluation may increase; whereas a factor
developed and included as a measure of effectiveness in a
qualitative manner may have an oversimplified effect on the
evaluation. Consider the effect that a new enemy electronic
jammer might have as an uncertain factor. If the jammer
was quantified as an input with a wide range of capabilities
and included in the assessment portion of the methodology
it might have a significant effect on the critical variables
such as units suppressed, number of successful penetrations,
number of penetrating aircraft lost, number of targets destroyed
or other variables. This effect might be reflected in the
measurement of system effectiveness but the cost might be
prohibitive. If it were included as a constant factor added
to the effectiveness measure the cost would be less but the
effectiveness value might be disproportionately affected by
the term.
Another way to include a difficult factor might be to
deal with it as a nominal value or best estimate to be carried
through the evaluation. In this way the factor is evaluated
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at a lesser cost but if the value is not correct, the
factor and any other interdependent factors may have an
adverse effect on the evaluation. Sensitivity analysis at
the end of the evaluation would be another way to address
this problem.
In analyzing this methodology it is important to recog-
nize that there are difficult factors that must be considered,
and an air defense methodology will have as many or more of
these factors as other evaluations. The best approach is
probably that of reference 19; do not ignore these factors
but try to identify them and include them to whatever extent
possible. How they should be included is a decision that
must be based upon consideration of their contribution in
relation to the evaluation constraints.
78

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It was noted in Sections I and II that improved method-
ology for evaluating air defense system effectiveness is
needed to provide decision makers with a better basis for
determining preferred systems and the "best" deployment of
these systems. This thesis has investigated the factors
upon which air defense system effectiveness depends and has
proposed a methodology appropriate for such evaluations
.
A key determination in the system effectiveness study
process was seen to be the identification of the system to
be evaluated. To the unintiated this may appear to be ob-
vious, but case studies (such as Ref. [28]) were considered
in which the determination (more precisely, the incorrect
determination) was one of the evaluation weaknesses or
"lessons learned". This determination is particularly im-
portant, since the system determines not only the level at
which the threat is considered but also indicates the inter-
faces and interactions that must be considered within the
hierarchy of supersystems and subsystems
.
The mission of air defense, in general, is to protect
friendly combat assets by neutralizing enemy aircraft. If
one views the battlefield as three dimensional and considers
the combat options available to an enemy's aircraft and
missile systems it is clear that enemy tactics and objectives
depend on friendly air defense systems. Additionally, the
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friendly air defense system consists of several complementary
systems (for example, HIMAD, LOMAD, SHORAD, friendly inter-
ceptor aircraft) which function in support of each other.
Based on these observations it was concluded that air defense
should be evaluated at the theater level. This conclusion
also has an heuristic appeal when considering the air battle
in relation to air defense systems. Moreover, the need to
evaluate at the theater level is apparent when consideration
is given to the fact that enemy aircraft might well have the
range and combat power to attack objectives anywhere within
the theater of operations.
It was discussed that system effectiveness must be made
operational (i.e. concrete). The tactical scenario is the
vehicle for accomplishing this by considering concrete
realizations of enemy threat, friendly and enemy systems,
friendly and enemy missions, and the combat environment.
Specific weaknesses in the current state-of-the-art exist
for the identification and quantification of military
objectives. Thus, it is recommended that future research
be done on these topics. Because past large system (such as
air defense) evaluations have failed to (either explicitly
or implicitly) consider uncertainties (such as uncertainties
in input data) or to assess sensitivity of study results to
variations in input and other parameters, it is also recom-
mended that future research be undertaken in these areas
.
This research could be accomplished in part by following
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Weiss 1 [Ref. 45] recommendation to maintain a continuous
modeling and evaluation activity throughout the life cycle
of systems.
Additional topics for further research are the need for
more quantitative information about the interfaces and inter-
3
actions throughout the system hierarchy, particularly C
,
and in the area of conflict termination. Recent conflicts in
the Middle East and Southeast Asia indicate that employing
integrated air defense systems can reduce the effectiveness
of air warfare over ground forces and vital assets. Additional
quantitative information concerning interfaces and interactions
would contribute greatly to system integration. Conflict
termination is an appropriate area for future research because
the length of an engagement may affect the objectives that
are selected for the system. Short term objectives might be
to prevent damage to a vital area, whereas a long term
objective might be to inflict a prescribed level of attrition
over a period of time.
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APPENDIX A. ATTACK-DEFENSE GAME
The advantage of evaluating at a higher system level may
be seen by Dresher's game theory approach to Defense of Two
Targets Against Attack [Ref. 11]. Suppose that blue, the
defender, has two targets t-, and t~ of values k, and k 2 ,
respectively, which are to be defended against an attack by
red. Assume in this case that red and blue are equally strong
and have the same number of forces S
.
A strategy for red is an allocation of x attackers to t^
and S -x to t 2 , where < x _< S . A strategy for blue is an
allocation of y defenders to t-, , where < y < S, and S -y
to t
2









Let the payoff to red be proportional to the number of
attacking units that reach the target and the target value








if x > y
if x < y
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where k, may be called the payoff per attacking unit that
penetrates blue's defenses at t-, . Since M(x,y) is a convex
function for y for each x, the value of the game is
v = min max M(x,y) = min max [k2y ,k, (S-y)
]
y x y




= k.. (S-y) and blue's optimal strategy (y*) = *-— , .
JL <-










Solving red's optimal strategy, M(x, r-— , ) = v
,Kl 2
and this equation gives two solutions:
x-, - ; x 2
= S
.
Then 3M (°>y*> = v 3M(S f y*) = _ .men,
8y
k
2 , ay j^
which provides red's optimal strategy as the function




ak + (1-a) (-k, ) =0 or a =
2 KJ
. „, v Jv1# „ ^ » - ^ + J^
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The solution of the game is explained as follows: the
defender splits his forces and may adopt a fixed deployment
k, k~
of those forces; =-— . of them at t, and ?-— , of them













t, and with probability r-— , . the attacker chooses t2 .
If red (attacker) is chosen to be enemy aircraft and blue
(defender) is designated as air defense systems, the advantage
of evaluating at the higher level becomes apparent. The
defending forces deployed at t^ and t 2 will be engaged by all
or none of the attacking aircraft depending on red's random
selection of a target. If the system were evaluated at one
target (subsystem level) , say t-, , the blue forces would either
be completely effective (because red attacked t
? )
or be
ineffective (because red overloaded the system at t, )
.
By considering the conflict at a higher level the observer
(analyst) has the advantage of a more realistic view of the
evaluation. By allocating optimally blue accepts the fact
that red can locally saturate the air defense system, but blue
prevents red from achieving several areas of saturation by
selecting a proportional defense and provides the target with
maximum defense subject to tactical constraints. Allocation
of forces in this manner is referred to as an application of
the "no soft spot" principle, which is further investigated
by References 7 and 8. This implies that air defense has
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weaknesses of being vulnerable to local (subsystem) saturation,
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